Formal and informal commercial sex work is a way of life for many poor women in developing countries. Though sex workers have long been identi…ed as crucial in a¤ecting the spread of HIV/AIDS, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the nature of sex-for-money transactions remains poorly understood. Using a unique panel dataset constructed from 192 self-reported sex worker diaries which include detailed information on sexual behavior, labor supply, and income shocks, we …nd that sex workers adjust their supply of risky, better compensated sex to cope with unexpected income shocks, exposing themselves to increased risk of HIV infection. In particular, women are 3.2% more likely to see a client, 21.7% more likely to have anal sex, and 20.6% more likely to have unprotected sex on days in which a household member falls ill. Women also increase their supply of risky sex on days after missing work due to STI symptoms. Given that HIV prevalance has been estimated at 9.8% in this part of Kenya, these behavioral responses entail signi…cant health risks for sex workers and their partners, and suggests that sex workers are unable to cope with income risk through other formal or informal consumption smoothing mechanisms.
Introduction
Exchanging sex for money, goods, or services is a way of life for many poor women in developing countries, yet little is understood about the way that the commercial or transactional sex market Even estimating the number of women engaged in transactional sex is notoriously di¢ cult. This is particularly true in sub-Saharan Africa, where transactional sex is present within many types of sexual relationships, including long-term partnerships and even marriage (Swidler and Watkins, 2007; Caldwell et al., 1989; Luke, 2006; Schoepf, 2004; Hunter, 2002; Wojcicki, 2002a ).
In Kenya, 14 .5% of men and 5.5% of women aged 15-49 report having ever engaged in transactional sex, a …gure which is likely an underestimate given the sensitive nature of the question (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004) . In this context, commercial sex work might be thought of as one extreme along a continuum of sexual relationships that feature a transactional component, with either "dating" or monogamous marriage at the other extreme. In this study, we identi…ed 1,205 formal and informal sex workers in Busia, Kenya, a peri-urban town in Western Kenya. This amounts to roughly 11.6% of the population of Busia women aged 15-49. This paper utilizes a unique panel dataset constructed from 192 daily sex worker diaries to analyze how sex workers decide whether to engage in unprotected sex with clients. The diaries included questions on income, expenditures, transfers given and received, and, most importantly, the speci…c sexual services provided to each client, the amounts paid for these services, and whether they used a condom for each sex act. In total, the dataset includes information on 18,894 transactions over 12,432 sex worker days.
We study sex workers'decisions in an intertemporal framework, and estimate how the supply of unprotected sex is a¤ected by health shocks. We …nd compelling evidence that women increase their supply of risky, better compensated sex in response to short-term income shocks at home.
Women are 3.2% more likely to see a client, 21.7% more likely to have anal sex, and 20.6% more likely to engage in unprotected sex on days in which another household member (typically 1 a child) falls ill. Similar responses are observed on days just after a woman recovers from the symptoms of an STI (which arguably might be seen as an exogenous shock to her ability to supply sex). Women do this in order to capture the roughly 38 Kenyan shilling (US $0.54) premium for unprotected sex and the 74 shilling (US $1.06) premium to anal sex.
Our results are related to a number of other studies of risk-coping mechanisms in poor countries, especially since the women we study make up a sizeable fraction of the population of adult women in the area. Like most people in developing countries, the women in our sample lack access to formal credit or savings, and the informal risk coping mechanisms that are typically available to sex workers (such as informal insurance systems of gifts and loans between friends and family) have consistently been shown by other authors to be ine¢ cient in insuring risk (i.e., Townsend, 1994; Paxson, 1992; Gertler and Gruber, 2002) . The increase in transactional sex we …nd is similar to the labor supply e¤ect documented by, for instance, Kochar (1995 Kochar ( , 1999 , though the increase in labor supply we …nd here is of independent interest because it comes at such a high cost: HIV prevalence has been estimated at 9.8% in Busia District (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004) . Over time, the increases in risky sex that we observe here have enormous health consequences for these women, their sexual partners, and society as a whole as HIV is passed on to the general population. These results are all the more striking because we focus on daily income shocks, rather than larger shocks such as annual or seasonal agricultural ‡uctuations. This paper is one of the few studies to identify and document speci…c costs to ine¢ cient consumption smoothing, beyond consumption ‡uctuations themselves. Other examples include Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) , who argue that Indian farmers are forced to use productive assets (bullocks) to smooth consumption, incurring substantial reductions in long-term productivity in the process, and Jacoby and Skou…as (1997), who …nd that Indian households pull their children out of school to work on the farm when shocks occur, which may reduce the long-term earnings potential of their children. Our study also highlights the di¤erence between income smoothing and consumption smoothing, as discussed in Morduch (1995) . Empirically, consumption by the women in our sample is insensitive to health shocks, so that standard tests would conclude that women are well-insured against these shocks. Such tests do not explicitly account for how 2 consumption smoothing is achieved, which in this case involves a signi…cant health cost. 1 The results of this study also have important implications for understanding the spread of HIV/AIDS, and in designing interventions to limit its spread. In sub-Saharan Africa, the risk of HIV/AIDS infection is enormous for both formal and informal sex workers. Among formal sex workers, the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate has been estimated to be as high as 25 to 75 percent (National AIDS Control Council [Kenya] are similarly large for women that supply transactional sex more casually. Dunkle et al. (2004) estimated that informal sex workers in South Africa were 54% more likely to be HIV positive than other women. Research on concurrent partners in sub-Saharan Africa also suggests that these women may have a similar or even greater impact on HIV transmission than "formal" sex workers (Epstein, 2007; Morris and Kretzschmar, 1997; Hudson, 1996) . This paper sheds light as to why these women do not choose to use condoms, and …nds evidence that unexpected health shocks form part of the explanation.
To our knowledge, the relationship between shocks and the labor supply of sex workers has not been formally studied within economics. 2 However, some qualitative sociological and anthropological research has suggested that women have sex with multiple partners or develop sexual networks for …nancial support and income security (Swidler and Watkins, 2007; Schoepf, 2004; Hunter, 2002; Wojcicki, 2002b) . Researchers have also examined the types and amounts of gifts received from partners in informal or transactional sex relationships (Luke, 2006; Dunkle et al., 2004; Luke, 2003) , but not the e¤ect of income shocks or income risk on those transfers. In economics, our paper is somewhat related to Edlund and Korn (2002) in that we both study sex workers, but our paper adds health risk as an additional dimension and focuses on choices within transactional sex over time, rather than on the choice to enter the commercial sex market.
Perhaps the most relevant economics papers are Gertler, Shah, and Bertozzi (2005) and Rao, Gupta, Lokshin, and Jana (2003), both of which …nd signi…cant compensating di¤erentials for unprotected sex (compared to protected sex) among CSWs. However, our focus here is not on 1 Chetty and Looney (2006) also discuss these issues. 2 One somewhat related paper is Ahlburg and Jensen (1998), which suggests that rural families mitigate interpersonal income risk by sending a family member into urban commercial sex work. Their argument focuses primarily on migration and secondarily on interpersonal risk, whereas we deal with intertemporal risk.
3 the premium itself but whether the existence of a premium allows women to increase the amount of unprotected sex that they supply as a strategy to deal with health shocks. In this respect, this paper also contributes to recent work examining whether sexual behavior might be rational given certain economic conditions (Oster, 2007) . 3 
Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a simple model of sex work in an intertemporal labor supply framework. The model is in the spirit of MaCurdy (1981) and Kochar (1995 Kochar ( , 1999 . The sex worker is assumed to live for T periods and to maximize lifetime expected utility over consumption c t and health risk h t as follows:
where is the discount rate, and t is information available at time t. We assume that @u(cs;h 0 ;:::;h t 1 ;ht) @ht < 0, to re ‡ect disutility from work, as well as the cost of pregnancy or the disutility from certain risky sex acts such as anal sex, experiencing the symptoms of an STI, or the health and socioeconomic consequences of HIV infection. Utility also depends on the history of past health risks taken. In particular, we assume that @u(cs;h 0 ;:::;h t 1 ;ht) @h k 0 for all k < t:
quality of life is lower for women that are at greater risk of being HIV positive. 4 The woman's intertemporal budget constraint is
where A t represent assets, r t is the interest rate, and P (h t ) is the total price paid by all clients on date t. The price is assumed to be increasing in h t (as it is empirically); otherwise, women 3 The paper is also related to Dupas (2007) , who evaluates an intervention to reduce risky sex along the intensive (whom to have sex with) rather than extensive (whether to have sex or not) margin. Similarly, our paper is focused on risky choices within transactional sex, rather than on the decision whether to engage in transactional sex or not. 4 We do not impose any functional form on the utility function, but one example that …ts into this framework would be one in which a woman's utility is una¤ected until she develops AIDS, is declining thereafter, and is 0 after she dies.
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would never have unprotected sex. We follow the literature and assume that this comes from the fact that clients derive utility from unprotected sex and are willing to pay more to forego condom usage. 5 Assuming an interior solution, the …rst order conditions at time t are that T t P s=t s t @u(c s ; h 0 ; :::; h s )
@u(c t ; h 0 ; :::; h t ) @c t t = 0 (4)
where t represents the marginal value of wealth at time t.
The last equation makes explicit that the marginal value of wealth at time t depends on expectations of future wealth. If a woman receives a permanent negative shock to her income such that E[ t+1 j t ] increases, then t increases and c t decreases. In addition, the amount of health risk that the woman chooses to take increases, from (3). Equation (3) also implies that women that believe themselves to already be at signi…cant risk of being HIV positive will increase their supply of risky sex by more than women that believe their risk is smaller (since the marginal cost of accepting greater risk is smaller for these women).
In this paper, however, we are interested in the e¤ect of transitory shocks that are small relative to lifetime income. Since these shocks are small, they should have no e¤ect on E[ t+1 j t ]
or t , and so should have no e¤ect on the amount of health risk that is accepted. Instead, these shocks should be smoothed through the use of savings (i.e., Paxson, 1992) . However, if savings and credit are unavailable so that the 1-period budget constraint binds, then it is possible that a woman may adjust her accepted health risk in response to even small, short-term income shocks. 6 5 See Gertler, Shah, and Bertozzi (2006) for a model of sex work that derives this condition explicitly. 6 Few women in our sample have formal savings accounts (see Table 1 ) or access to bank credit, but most save money informally at their home and have access to gifts and loans from friends and family.
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The implication of this simple model -that labor supply may adjust to short-term income shocks in the absence of perfect consumption smoothing -is not new, but the importance of our study is that the increase in labor supply comes at great individual cost in terms of increased risk of contracting HIV or other STIs. The increased health risk will also likely impose an external cost on society as a whole, as HIV is transmitted between sex workers and clients and then on to other partners. In addition, quite apart from any e¢ ciency calculation, the tests in this paper are of signi…cant importance in terms of designing interventions to limit the spread of HIV by sex workers. Town she knew who …t this description. For the purposes of this paper, we do not focus on the distinction between formal and informal sex workers.
We identi…ed 1,205 sex workers in Busia Town from this "snowball" technique. 8 Assuming 8 Working with a sample identi…ed by women in SHCP-organized peer groups has advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that women in the peer groups know other single women in their community with multiple concurrent sexual partners, which should increase the size and improve the representativeness of the identi…ed sample. Furthermore, the structure of the peer groups allows peer educators and peers to better locate the sex workers whom they identify. Finally, SHCP has had a long, stable relationship with sex workers in Western Province, so that sex workers trust the organization, which tended to limit non-participation and attrition among sampled sex workers. The major disadvantage is that the women identi…ed in this way may not be fully representative of the sample of sex workers in Busia Town. As in any snowball sampling technique, the sample includes fewer women right at the margin of participation in transactional sex. 
Data Collection
Of the 1,205 women that were identi…ed, a random sample of 248 women were selected for project participation, strati…ed by peer group. The data collection took place in two rounds:
Round 1 occurred between October and December, 2005, and Round 2 occurred between July and October, 2006. We asked each woman to keep a daily diary for the duration of each round in which she self-reported her income, expenditures, the transfers she had given and received, and the shocks she had encountered that day. We focus on three types of shocks in this study: own illness or injury, illness or injury of another household member, and the incidence of a sexually transmitted infection. Illness is an indicator variable that is coded as 1 if the individual reported having a cough, fever, diarrhea, cuts, or burns, or had reported su¤ering from malaria, typhoid or any other illness.
In the diaries, women were also asked to record detailed information on each encounter with a client, including the activities performed, whether a condom was used, and the price that was paid (both in cash and in goods or services). After a preliminary analysis of the Round 1 data, some additional questions were added to the Round 2 diaries. The additions which are relevant to this paper included questions on client characteristics and somewhat more detailed questions on the transfers received from regular clients. In each round, each respondent kept the diary for a period of 3 months, though the …rst few weeks were often not usable in the …nal analysis due to reporting errors made as women were learning the diaries.
The diaries were extensively pre-tested by the authors, a research assistant, and the two enumerators to maintain respondent con…dentiality, meet norms of cultural sensitivity, and to ensure that respondents understood all of the questions. To ensure data quality, the two enumerators conducted diary checks roughly once a week, during which they checked for errors and resolved mistakes with respondents.
In order for women to keep these self-reports, it was of course necessary that they could read and write Kiswahili, one of the o¢ cial languages in Kenya and the language used in the diaries.
Literacy levels in the sample were relatively high: 95% of the sample could read Kiswahili, and 88% could write Kiswahili (Table 1 ). To avoid losing illiterate women, a special e¤ort was made to keep them in the sample. Each illiterate woman was assigned a peer educator who met with her daily to read the diary questions and …ll in the answers for her.
In addition to the diaries, a background questionnaire in the style of the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Surveys was also administered by the enumerators. This survey included questions on family background, household characteristics, education, migration, land and durable good ownership, access to credit and savings, knowledge of HIV/AIDS, attitudes towards sex work, and other related questions. To compensate respondents for keeping the diaries, we paid women in Round 1 1,000 Kenyan shillings (US $14), and women in Round 2 1,500 Kenyan shillings (US $21) for their participation. 9 Of the 248 women that were sampled, we obtained complete, usable data from 192 of them (77%). The other women could not be included because they refused to participate or stopped …lling out the diaries during the sample period, because they moved to another area and could not be traced, or because they kept the diaries poorly or did not …ll them completely. In total, the …nal dataset consists of 192 women, 18,894 transactions, and 12,199 sex worker days. 10 
Descriptive Statistics 3.4.1 Background Statistics
Background statistics for our sample of sex workers are presented in Table 1 . Panel A shows that the average sex worker is 28 years old, has completed over 9 education grades, and has 9 Round 2 participants were compensated slightly more because the diaries were more detailed and took more time to complete. Panel A also presents statistics on the e¤ect that sex work has had on sex workers'perceptions of the likelihood that they will eventually marry (or remarry). Only 3% of women report that working in the commercial sex industry has made the prospect of future marriage less likely, but 41% report that working in sex work has made marriage more likely. This is notable because one explanation for the signi…cant wage premium to sex work is that it serves as a compensating di¤erential for reduced marriage market possibilities (Edlund and Korn, 2002) . These results, however, seem to suggest that this explanation is unlikely to be important for this population of sex workers and is consistent with Arunachalam and Shah (2008) . 12 HIV knowledge characteristics are shown in Panel B of Table 1 . Sixty percent of the sample has been tested for HIV, which is much higher than the national average ( 
Shocks, Transfers, and Expenditures
In this study, we focus on three types of health shocks that are commonly experienced by sex workers. The …rst is an indicator that is coded as 1 if the sex worker reported having a fever, cough, diarrhea, typhoid, malaria, cuts, burns, or other injuries or illnesses. The second is whether the sex worker reported that another member of the household su¤ered from any of these illnesses. The third is the occurrence of sexually transmitted infections (STIs), which should presumably a¤ect a woman's ability to supply sex. 13 Panel A of per day in sex work, compared to about 100 shillings (US $1.43) from other sources (such as agriculture, small business, or salaried work at bars or restaurants). The average woman engages in sex work on a bit more than 3 out of every 4 days and sees an average of 1.52 clients per day. 14 As in other studies of sex work, average income in the sample is very high relative to the average in the area: income from sex work is approximately 7 times that of other daily income earners in Busia District (Robinson, 2007) . This di¤erence is signi…cantly higher than the 56% income premium in Mexico found by Gertler, Shah, and Bertozzi (2005) and the 37% wage premium found by Rao et al. (2003) in Calcutta, and more in line with the much larger premium found by Booranapim and Mainwaring (2002) in Thailand.
Labor Supply and Sexual Behavior
The next few rows in Table 3 report mean sexual behavior in the sample. For each variable, Column 1 presents the overall daily average, and Columns 2-4 includes transaction level data.
Column 1 indicates that, over all the days covered (including those in which they did not work), women have vaginal sex on 74% of days, anal sex on 22% of days, and oral sex on 19% of days.
Women have unprotected sex on 18% of days, and have an average of 0.42 unprotected sex acts per day. From Column 2, women have vaginal sex with 95% of clients, anal sex with 23% of clients, oral sex with 19% of clients, and unprotected anal or vaginal sex with 16% of clients.
One important distinction between clients is those that are considered regulars and those that are considered casuals. Though this distinction is not completely clear, regular clients have had repeated encounters with a given woman and may be considered a boyfriend, lover, or partner. In focus group discussions, the women often cited emotional support and love as characteristics associated with a regular client. In contrast, casual clients are often not known to the sex worker before the transaction. Since casual clients can become regular clients over time, and many women have multiple regular clients, the de…nition of a regular and casual client can be hard to de…ne. However, since SHCP had already been using the regular and casual client terminology, we allowed the respondents to determine on their own if a particular client should 
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had ever had anal sex. 16 As mentioned previously, roughly 44% of the women in this sample participated in peer groups sponsored by the Strengthening STD / HIV Control Project in Kenya and received education about HIV and other STIs, as well as increased access to condoms. This is one reason why women may have scored so highly on the test of HIV knowledge presented in Table   2 . Compared to the marginal sex worker, these women should be more aware of the risks of unprotected sex, so the …gures in Table 3 are likely to be lower bounds on the frequency of unprotected sex among sex workers in rural Africa.
4 Risk Premium
Estimation
We will estimate a risk premium by performing a …xed e¤ects regression of the price paid by the client on the activities performed, and whether a condom was used. Ideally, this regression should control for client characteristics. However, we only have panel information on clients for a small portion of our data, so we will have to assume homogeneity on the demand side for most of what follows. This leaves us with an estimating equation of the type
for sex worker i at date t. This is an equation relating the price P it to the performance of risky sexual activities X hit and other activities X ait . Assuming homogeneity in demand on a particular date, the individual …xed e¤ect i will pick up di¤erences across women in bargaining power and in the willingness to accept risk, while other time-varying e¤ects such as changes in demand on particular days will be captured with date controls v t (v t includes controls for the day of the week and the month of the year). " it is a random disturbance term that may capture unmeasured factors such as a woman's or client's mood at a particular time. If this regression is properly speci…ed, h will re ‡ect the risk premium to the risky activity X hit (mainly unprotected 1 6 To explore the implications of anal sex for HIV transmission, we should ideally have measures of unprotected anal sex. We only have this information for part of our sample, however. 14 sex). 17 X ait will consist of all other activities that do not fundamentally involve an increase in risk of contracting HIV, such as providing company or performing a massage.
Results
The results from estimating Equation (6) are presented in Table 4 . Regressions in Columns 1-3 are conducted on the entire sample, while regressions in Columns 4-6 are restricted to the Round 2 sample in order to include client characteristics as explanatory variables. In addition to the variables shown, all regressions also include a control for the round of data collection.
The variable used to estimate the compensating di¤erential for unprotected sex is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the woman had at least 1 unprotected sex act (with anal and vaginal sex aggregated together). 18 The results suggest a sizeable risk premium to unprotected sex and to the provision of other services. The premium to anal sex is approximately 74 Kenyan shillings (US $1.06), which can be explained partially through the increased health risk. 19 Also of note is the 69 shilling (US $0.99) return to company, which likely re ‡ects unobserved characteristics of clients that request company. Column 1 also shows that unprotected anal or vaginal sex is associated with a 38
shilling (US $0.54) increase in the price. As the total average price paid is 485 shillings, this amounts to a premium of about 7.8%, which is rather low when compared with the risk premium of 23% calculated by Gertler, Shah, and Bertozzi (2005). However, the market for sex work in Mexico, where sex work is legal and regulated and where average incomes are higher, is likely to di¤er greatly from the Kenya context. The lower risk premium may also be the result of 1 7 Protected anal sex may be considered risky as well because of the increased likelihood of tearing a condom during anal intercourse. 1 8 We obtained similar estimates using the number of unprotected sex acts as a regressor, and by disaggregating unprotected sex into unprotected anal and unprotected vaginal sex. These latter estimates are much less precise because those measures were only available in the round 2 data. 1 9 Studies on HIV transmission through male-to-female anal sex are very rare, and causality is di¢ cult to establish, but sex workers in South Africa that supply anal sex (either protected or unprotected) have been found to have a 10-120% increase in the risk of HIV infection (Karim and Ramjee, 1998) . Similarly large increases have been estimated for couples in Europe (European Study Group on Heterosexual Transmission of HIV, 1992). We are not aware of studies that estimate the per-act transmission probability for heterosexual anal sex in Africa.
di¤erences in data -Gertler, Shah, and Bertozzi (2005) collect recall data on the last three to four client transactions rather than a longer panel. In addition, only 11.7% of their sample has variation in condom usage with clients, while 70% of our sample has variation in condom usage.
Columns 2 and 3 run the same speci…cation among the regular and casual client samples separately. The di¤erences between regular and casual clients in the prices paid for various activities are not signi…cantly di¤erent (tests not shown), but regular clients actually pay more for unprotected sex than do casual clients (the di¤erence is not signi…cant). These results suggest that women are compensated for risk even by regular clients, and that women have at least some discretion over the activities they perform.
Columns 4-6 restrict attention to the Round 2 data, so that we may estimate the e¤ect of client characteristics (as reported by the sex worker) on prices. These characteristics include whether the client is circumcised, the client's wealth level, attractiveness, and occupation, and whether the sex worker thinks the client is at high risk of having HIV/AIDS. We also include controls for tribe and cleanliness, though we do not include these coe¢ cients in the Table. Unfortunately, many of the client characteristics are missing because women often failed to keep track of this information. As these non-responses are almost certainly non-random, we need to be cautious in interpreting the results (though the inclusion of …xed e¤ects should eliminate some bias across women).
That said, the results in Columns 5 and 6 make intuitive sense. Prices are higher (though the coe¢ cient is insigni…cant) for wealthier clients and lower (signi…cant at 5% or 10%, depending on the speci…cation) for more attractive clients. The price does not seem to be signi…cantly higher for clients whom the sex worker raters to be at high risk of having HIV/AIDS.
In sum, the results of Table 4 are consistent with the notion that sex workers have some discretion in choosing whether to use a condom, that a risk premium exists to unprotected sex, and that it may be rational for women to choose to engage in unprotected sex to capture the risk premium. In the next section, we test whether women choose to do this.
Consumption Smoothing and the Supply of Unprotected Sex

Estimation
The simple model in Section 2 predicts that consumption and risky sexual behavior will respond to permanent income shocks but not to transitory shocks that do not a¤ect the lifetime budget constraint. To examine these relationships empirically, we will estimate …xed e¤ects equations of the type
e it = S it + e i + e
where h it is a measure of unprotected sex, e it represents household expenditures (we did not collect consumption data), and the …xed e¤ects i and e i are meant to proxy for individualspeci…c variables, notably preferences and the marginal utility of lifetime wealth. v t and e v t include controls for the day of the week and the month of the year. S it is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the household encountered a health shock, and " it and f " it are iid error terms. such as bullocks to smooth consumption (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). As we will discuss below, our own estimated is very low, but women incur signi…cant (expected) health costs by increasing their supply of risky sex in response to income shocks.
Results
Expenditures
Before examining the labor supply responses to health shocks, we perform …xed e¤ects regressions of daily levels of various expenditure categories on the 3 types of shocks previously discussed:
whether a woman is sick herself, whether a member of her household is sick, and whether a woman is su¤ering from an STI. We also include an indicator for the …rst day after having experienced an STI. Since experiencing an STI often precludes supplying sex, women can only adjust their behavior after the STI has passed. All dependent variables are aggregated at the day level, so there is only one observation per woman. Results are presented in Table 5 .
For all of the shocks, total and private expenditures 20 seem to be insensitive to the occurrence of income shocks. For instance, private expenditures actually increase by about 11 shillings (US $0.16) when another household member gets ill, and food expenditures are insensitive to all of these shocks. Taken at face value, these results suggest that sex workers are well insured against unexpected income shocks, though this result says nothing about how consumption smoothing is achieved. As the next few Tables will show, sex workers maintain consumption in large part by increasing their supply of unprotected sex and accepting signi…cant health costs. Table 6 presents …xed e¤ects estimates of the impact of the various shock measures on labor supply. Starting with Panel A, own sickness has the expected e¤ect for all labor supply measures:
Participation in the Sex Sector and the Supply of Unprotected Sex
women are less likely to participate in the commercial sex market when they are sick. The more interesting result is the e¤ect of household sickness on labor supply. Women are 2.7 percentage points more likely to see a client when a household member falls ill. This amounts to a 3.2% increase in the probability of participating in the sex sector. As can be seen in Columns 3 and 4, women increase their participation by taking on more casual clients. This is notable because women usually do not know casual clients before the transaction, so they probably can be less sure of the probability that a casual client is HIV positive than they could be of a regular client. These responses are very similar to Kochar (1995 Kochar ( , 1999 , who shows that individuals work more when their households incur negative income shocks. In this paper, we are ultimately interested in how the supply of unprotected sex responds to health shocks, since an increase in unprotected sex entails a signi…cant (expected) health cost on women, especially for women that are HIV negative. If unprotected sex is indeed very sensitive to short-term health shocks, then alternative consumption smoothing mechanisms must be quite ine¢ cient, and the provision of more e¤ective smoothing mechanisms could have substantial bene…ts in reducing the spread of HIV. also have 0.068 more sex acts on such days, though the coe¢ cient in this regression is not quite signi…cant at 10%. As will be discussed in more detail in Section 6, these increases substantially increase the likelihood of being infected with HIV.
Panel B, which focuses on STIs, shows a similar pattern with even larger coe¢ cients, though the coe¢ cients do not reach statistical signi…cance due to the rarity of STIs. In a larger sample, we expect it would be possible to …nd statistically signi…cant e¤ects.
Taken together, Tables 6 and 7 suggest that the supply of sex (including unprotected sex)
is very sensitive to even small, short-term income shocks. Furthermore, the results imply that intertemporal income risk might have a substantial impact on the likelihood that women who supply transactional sex become infected with HIV.
Robustness Checks
The results of the previous section suggest that sex workers accept a signi…cant amount of health risk to deal with short-term illness shocks, which implies that other consumption smoothing techniques have failed. In this section, we provide several robustness checks to test more closely whether our results appear consistent with a consumption smoothing explanation for the labor supply response. Ideally we would be able to check whether responses are smaller for women that have access to formal consumption smoothing mechanisms such as individual savings accounts in a bank, but the vast majority of women in this sample are unbanked and only have access to group savings accounts that heavily restrict their withdrawals (see Table 1 ). For this reason, we are unable to compare women with varying levels of access to smoothing mechanisms. Instead, we examine how the results vary by income level and by perceived HIV status.
Results by Income Level
If women supply more risky sex as a consumption smoothing mechanism, it should be the poorest women that are most likely to use unprotected sex as a risk-coping technique, particularly since the average sex worker in Western Kenya makes signi…cantly more than other daily income earners (i.e., Robinson, 2007) . There remains signi…cant heterogeneity in sex worker earnings, however: over the sample period, a woman at the 25th percentile of the sex worker income distribution earned 509 Ksh (US $7.27) per day, while a woman at the 75th percentile earned 20 1,089 Ksh (US $15.56) per day.
To explore whether it is poorer women that are most sensitive to the shocks, we construct indicators for whether the sex worker's daily income is below the daily income of the median sex worker (US $10.94), and interact this indicator with the household health shocks. Table 8 presents …xed e¤ects regressions of sexual behavior on health shocks and the interactions. Since we are primarily interested in the sickness indicators, we present only those results in this Table. The results are generally consistent with a consumption smoothing explanation as the interactions are generally positive, though several coe¢ cients are not statistically signi…cant. However, the interaction is signi…cant for whether the sex worker participated in the transactional sex market, the number of clients (and casual clients) she saw, and whether she had vaginal sex.
The coe¢ cient for the regression for unprotected sex is not signi…cant, though it is positive and large in magnitude.
In general, Table 8 suggests that poorer women are more sensitive to short term health shocks than are richer women. It is interesting to note, however, that certain responses appear to be statistically signi…cant and substantial in magnitude even for richer women. For instance, we estimate that women in the top half of the sex worker income distribution increase the probability that they have anal sex by 3.1 percentage points on days in which a household member falls ill. This may suggest that responses are driven in part by behavioral biases such as reference-dependent preferences, at least for women at the top end of the sex worker income distribution.
HIV Status and Labor Supply Responses
We have shown that women increase their supply of unprotected sex when a household member falls ill, and have argued that accepting that health risk imposes a cost on women. However, sex workers are already at considerable risk of contracting HIV and so may already be HIV positive (or believe that they are likely to be HIV positive). If so, the additional health risk incurred may be relatively minimal (though the risk of STI infection is likely non-trivial). 21 Though we cannot know if HIV positive women respond di¤erently to shocks than do HIV negative women, since we did not test women for HIV, we did ask women if they had ever been voluntarily tested for HIV and what they thought their risk of being infected was. We classify as likely HIV positive any woman that had been tested for HIV and that responded that the probability that she was infected with HIV was over 50%. We classify 7.0% of women as likely HIV positive in this way, a …gure which is likely a major underestimate given that the HIV prevalence was 9.8% in this part of Kenya and sex workers are presumably more likely to be infected than the average Kenyan.
We …rst test whether the risk premium to unprotected sex di¤ers between women that are classi…ed as likely positive and other women. 22 The results are presented in Appendix Table 1 .
The risk premium for women that are likely positive is just 18 Ksh and statistically insigni…cant (due in large part to the small sample size), while the premium for other women is 44 Ksh (which is statistically signi…cant). The di¤erence in the estimated premia is statistically signi…cant, suggesting that women that believe they are positive charge a lower premium than do other women. 23 This result lends additional support to the notion that the risk premium is rational.
The most important question for our analysis is whether it is only women that already believe that they are HIV positive that switch to unprotected sex when shocks occur. This question is crucial in understanding whether our results imply signi…cant welfare loss for women due to inadequate consumption smoothing, and in understanding how the observed labor supply responses might a¤ect the spread of HIV. Appendix Table 2 explores this issue by interacting the occurrence of health shocks with the indicator for whether the woman is likely to be HIV positive.
In general, it does appear that those women that are likely to be HIV positive are more likely to increase their supply of unprotected sex in response to health shocks, though women that are not likely to be positive also signi…cantly increase the level of risk they accept. The 2 2 We also examined whether women with higher scores on the HIV knowledge test we administered charged a di¤erent premium, but the interaction was insigni…cant. 2 3 We also examined whether all women that reported having a greater than 50% chance of being HIV positive charged a lower premium than women that reported having a lower than 50% chance, but the di¤erence in premia was not statistically signi…cant.
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interacted term is positive in all regressions except for the regression on sex work income as a dependent variable, 24 though it is only statistically signi…cant for the regressions on the indicator for participation in the transactional sex market and on having anal sex. However, women that are not classi…ed as likely to be HIV positive still increase their probability of having unprotected sex and anal sex by 2.8 percentage points and 3.2 percentage points, respectively (compared to 3.2 and 4.3 percentage points, respectively, in the earlier speci…cation, in Table 7) . 25 In summary, responses seem to be higher for women that are likely to already be positive, though still high for women that are not. We conclude from this that HIV negative women incur signi…cant health costs by increasing their probability of having unprotected sex in response to shocks.
How Big is the Expected Health Cost?
The increase in unprotected sex that we observe among sex workers in Western Kenya imposes at least some health cost on women. But how big are these costs in real terms? In this section, we estimate the increase in the probability of becoming infected with HIV due to inadequate consumption smoothing mechanisms. We conservatively do not include any costs associated with increases in the probability of becoming infected with an STI, and we do not take into account the increased risk of becoming infected with HIV while su¤ering from an STI (see Oster (2005) for more on this issue). We also do not include costs associated with reinfection. For these reasons, the estimates in this section should be thought of as lower bounds on the probability of HIV infection.
With that in mind, the probability of an HIV negative woman becoming infected after a sexual encounter with a client is p client p unprotected t, where p client is the probability that the client is HIV positive, p unprotected is the probability that the sex worker has unprotected sex with the client, and t is the probability that an HIV positive client transmits the virus to the sex worker if they have unprotected sex. Clients of sex workers are at much greater risk of HIV 2 4 This is due in part to the fact that women that are likely to be HIV positive charge a lower premium for unprotected sex. 2 5 We also examined how labor supply responses di¤ered for women reporting a greater than 50% chance of being infected (whether or not they had been tested), and found no di¤erence between their behavior and that of women that reported a lower than 50% chance of infection. Ghana, and Cotonou, Benin, respectively. We conservatively assume that the clients of sex workers have a 25% chance of infection (roughly 2.5 times that of the general population). We use 1/1000 as the transmission probability (Gray et al., 2001; Magruder, 2008) .
From Table 7 , the average sex worker has unprotected sex 0.342 times per day when her household does not experience a health shock, and 0.410 times per day when her household does. 26 From Table 2 , household health shocks occur on 37% of days. Thus, a woman that was perfectly insured from these health shocks would have unprotected sex roughly 365 0:342 125 times per year, whereas the average woman in our sample would have sex 365 (0:342 0:63 + 0:41 0:37) 134 times per year. Assuming this woman is initially HIV negative, she is infected with probability 1=1000 0:25 = 0:00025 after each unprotected sex act. We assume that the probability of infection from protected sex is 0.
An initially HIV negative woman who is perfectly insured will be infected with probability 1 (1 tp client ) 125y after y years, while the average woman in our sample will be infected with probability 1 (1 tp client ) 134y . Table 9 summarizes the probability of infection after di¤erent time periods. As might be expected, the probability of infection is high even if women were perfectly able to smooth their consumption, since all of these women have a large number of unprotected sex acts. However, for women that use unprotected sex to cope with income risk, the probability of HIV infection is 0.2 percentage points higher after 1 year, 0.4 percentage points higher after 2 years, 1 point higher after 5 years, and 1.6 percentage points higher after 10 years. In percentage terms, these increases are on the order of 5-7% after all time periods.
Since the price premium to unprotected sex is just 44 Ksh (US $0.63), this means that women accept, for instance, a 7.1% increase in the risk of HIV infection after 1 year for about US $5.67.
Given average incomes of the women in the sample, the extra income earned does not seem adequate to compensate women for the risk that they are taking.
Discussion
Using panel data from a sample of 192 formal and informal sex workers in Busia, Kenya, this paper is the …rst to quantitatively investigate the relationship between sex work and income risk. We conducted our study in rural Western Kenya, an area in which transactional sex is prevalent: we estimate that 11.6% of the adult female population aged 15-49 supplies at least some transactional sex. For this reason, our results are generalizable to a larger population of women than is true of studies of sex work in more developed countries, and our …ndings …t into the larger literature on risk-coping and consumption smoothing in poor countries.
Like many people in poor countries, the sex workers in our sample are subject to considerable income risk but lack e¤ective formal or informal means of coping with that risk. To make up for income shortfalls, these women choose to increase their supply of better compensated but more dangerous and more unpleasant sex in order to capture the price premiums associated with these activities. In particular, we …nd that women are 3.2% more likely to see a client, 20.6% more likely to engage in unprotected sex, and 21.7% more likely to have anal sex on days in which a household member experiences a health shock. Women also appear to increase their supply of risky sex immediately after recovering from a sexually transmitted infection (STI), the symptoms of which likely make it di¢ cult or impossible to engage in sex work until it is treated. Given the high HIV prevalence rate in this part of Kenya (9.8%) and the large health risks associated with unprotected sex, these increases in risky sexual behavior have enormous health consequences.
These results, therefore, suggest that in addition to helping women exit sex work, there are opportunities to reduce the health risks within sex work beyond HIV education and condom distribution. Focusing speci…cally on household illness, sex workers may be better able to reduce their risky sexual behavior if their children and dependents had better access to health services or subsidized health inputs. Public health interventions aimed at children are likely to have positive externalities on the spread of HIV, and perhaps future evaluations of childhood disease interventions can monitor these e¤ects.
The results of this paper suggest that the existing informal consumption smoothing mechanisms that are available to sex workers are ine¢ cient and that women incur substantial health 25 costs by choosing to increase their supply of risky sex as an alternative risk coping strategy. For this reason, the provision of formal consumption smoothing or risk coping mechanisms could substantially improve sex worker welfare, and could also potentially limit the spread of HIV.
Much remains unknown about the transactional sex market in developing countries, and this study has only been able to scratch the surface by focusing on intertemporal risk and the supply of unprotected sex. Future work might focus attention on the extensive decision to enter the commercial sex market in the …rst place, rather than on the intensive margin as we do in this paper. More research is crucial, however, in order to understand how best to design interventions to limit the spread of HIV, a disease which remains the leading cause of death in sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS, 2007). Regressions include controls for other responses to the questions "Is the client wealthy?" and "Is the client handsome," but the coefficients are omitted for space. is handsome. Columns 5 and 6 also include controls for client tribe, occupation and cleanliness. Averages prices paid by type of client: regular -485 shillings; casual -432 shillings; overall -450 shillings. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% ^M eans of dependent variables are means when all shocks are equal to 0. Private expenditures include alcohol, soda, cigarettes, meals in restaurants, clothing, health and beauty products, and other privately consumed categories such as airtime for cellular phones. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% All regressions are fixed effects regressions with controls for the month and for the day of the week. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include controls for the round of data collection. Panels include controls for own sickness though the coefficients are not reported. Percentile of income distribution: minimum -153 Ksh; 25th -509 Ksh; 50th -766 Ksh; 75th -1,089 Ksh; maximum -2,068 Ksh. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Calculation assumes that the average client has 0.25 probability of being infected with HIV and that the transmission probability per sex act is 0.001. The estimated number of unprotected sex acts is taken from Table 7 All regressions are fixed effects regressions with controls for the month and the day of the week. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include controls for the round of data collection. Sickness is an indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent reports a cough, fever, malaria, typhoid, diarrhea, cuts, burns, or other illnesses. The variable for likely being HIV positive equals 1 if the woman had previously taken an HIV test and reported that she believed herself to have a greater than 50% chance of being HIV positive. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
